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CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY AS PART OF THE
SOCIAL SAFETY NET: FRESH START OR
TREADMILL?
Jean Braucher*
I. INTRODUCTION
The current state of the U.S. personal bankruptcy system
can best be understood in its complex context, one that in-
cludes a rapid expansion of consumer credit in the last two
decades,1 declining savings over that period,2 an incomplete
* Roger Henderson Professor of Law, University of Arizona, James E.
Rogers College of Law.
1. See FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE, tbl. G.19 Historical Data
(showing that total consumer credit outstanding rose from $437 billion in De-
cember 1983 to over $2 trillion in December 2003, an increase of nearly 500%),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G19/hist/cc-histmt.html
(last visited Mar. 4, 2004); see also REP. OF THE NAT'L. BANKR. REV.
COMMISSION 84 (1997) (stating that consumer debt grew by 700% from 1977 to
1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT].
2. See Richard Peach & Charles Steindel, A Nation of Spendthrifts? An
Analysis of Trends in Personal and Gross Saving, 6 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. &
FIN. 10 (2000) (noting that personal savings rate declined ten percent from 1983
to 2000, as borrowing increased); see also Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent
Changes in US. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of
Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL. 4-5, tbl.1 (Jan. 2003) (showing that be-
tween 1992 and 2001, the percentage of families who saved increased by 2.1% to
59.2%, but the percentage in the bottom quintile in income who saved declined
by 0.2% to 30.0%, and the percentage in the bottom quintile in net worth who
saved declined by 3.2% to 34.5%), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/OlO3lead.pdf (last visited Apr.
8, 2004). Thus, in lower income and lower net worth families, two-thirds or
more did not save at all in 2001, and among all families, more than forty per-
cent did not save that year. Also, the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, from which these figures are drawn, uses a different formula
from the national income and product accounts (NIPA) measure of savings,
which showed a decline in savings from 1998 to 2001, both in levels and as a
percentage of disposable income. Id. at 6. Both SCF and NIPA have limita-
tions, see id. at 6, and putting the two together, the overall picture seems to be
one of at best fairly flat rates of savings, with many families continuing not to
save at all, and at worst of a long decline in savings.
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social safety net,3 and a general cultural affinity for risk-
taking, both in credit-fueled consumption and in productive
ventures.4 The developing field of comparative consumer
bankruptcy has helped to provide this broad perspective.5 In
particular, gaps in unemployment and health care insurance
benefits in the United States, combined with ready availabil-
ity of consumer credit, have led to use of credit as a self-
financed safety net, contributing to dramatic increases in per-
sonal bankruptcy filings.
Europeans see the relative permissiveness of U.S. per-
sonal bankruptcy law as grounded in our individualism and
limited welfare state programs, particularly our limited un-
employment and health care insurance.7 They also fear that
they are headed down the same path of over-indebtedness as
Americans, albeit with a time lag.8 European personal bank-
3. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Generosity Versus Accessibility: Bankruptcy,
Consumer Credit, and Health Care Finance in the US, in CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 283-300 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen et
al. eds., 2004) (summarizing gaps in private and public U.S. health insurance
and the role of medical debt in bankruptcy).
4. See Aizcorbe et al., supra note 2, at 21-23, tbl.11 (showing that the me-
dian value of total outstanding debt for the 75.1% of families that had any rose
9.6% from 1998 to 2001); id. at 27 (showing that aggregate debt payment to dis-
posable income ratio rose about one percent, to fourteen percent, from 1998 to
2001); see generally Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047 (1987) (discussing discharge as spurring
productivity of workers and encouraging risk-taking by entrepreneurs). A com-
parison with China's difficulties in implementing policies to combat deflation
provides a helpful perspective on our affinity for consumption on credit; these
Chinese policies discouraged savings and promoted consumer spending, but
they ran up against a cultural tradition that consumption should be based on
past savings and that borrowing is a public embarrassment, making it impossi-
ble to displace cash as king in the Chinese marketplace. See Xian-chu Zhang,
Development of Consumer Credit in China and Concerns About the Underlying
Legal Infrastructure, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, su-
pra note 3, at 108-18.
5. See generally CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 3.
6. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics for
Fiscal Year 2003, at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/0903f2.xls (last
visited Apr. 19, 2004) (reporting that over 1.6 million nonbusiness bankruptcy
cases were filed in 2003).
7. See Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, Collective or Individual? Constructions
of Debtors and Creditors in Consumer Bankruptcy, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 41-60 (arguing that American bank-
ruptcy law reflects liberal individualism in comparison to the social welfare ori-
entation of European debt adjustment laws).
8. See Michael Adler, The Overseas Dimension: What Can Canada and the
United States Learn from the United Kingdom?, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 415,
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ruptcy laws are a recent innovation, enacted in the 1980s and
1990s in response to the problem that existing unemployment
compensation programs were not generous enough to handle
growing consumer debt.9 These new European laws are much
less generous than U.S. bankruptcy law, at least in their as-
pirations if not necessarily in reality.'x Europeans typically
regard bankruptcy as an occasion for social work to preserve
and extend the social welfare system.1 They tend to believe
that debtors in over their heads should learn to live at a sub-
sistence level while repaying debts and avoiding quick reen-
try into the credit system. 12
By comparison, personal bankruptcy in America recycles
debtors back into the consumer credit system almost immedi-
ately. 3 Those who provide financial education to U.S. debtors
in bankruptcy view this state of affairs as inevitable. 4
420 (1999) (noting that the credit economy in the United Kingdom resembles
that in North American some years ago and that growing role of consumer
credit inevitably leads to casualties).
9. See Joanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison,
Do We Cure a Market Failure or a Social Problem?, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 473,
481 (1999) [hereinafter Niemi-Kiesilainen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Compari-
son].
10. See id. at 500-03 (discussing how a fresh start is not the aim of Euro-
pean laws, although discharge is given at the end of a repayment process in
which repayment of less than fifteen percent of debt is the average, with some
debtors unable to repay at all).
11. Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, The Role of Consumer Counseling as Part
of the Bankruptcy Process in Europe, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 409, 413 (1999)
[hereinafter Niemi-Kiesilainen, Consumer Counselingi; see also Jean Braucher,
Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: The Perspective of Interest Analysis, in
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 319, 341-42
(discussing how the European laws dealing with debt adjustment are designed
to shore up the social welfare system) [hereinafter, Braucher Debtor Education
and Interest Analysis].
12. See Niemi-Kiesilainen, Consumer Counseling, supra note 11, at 413
(noting that European systems seek to have debtors avoid credit and fulfill
plans, often forcing debtors to learn to live at a subsistence level, in contrast to
credit counseling in North America that seeks to make debtors into better con-
sumers of credit).
13. NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 94 (citing a study by Michael Staten
documenting the practice of soliciting debtors for new credit shortly after their
bankruptcy discharges, when they cannot get another discharge for six years).
A debtor who gets a Chapter 7 discharge is not eligible to file for another for six
years. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2004).
14. See Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bank-
ruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 557, 587 & n.184 (2001) (discussing credit re-establishment as a topic in
education programs for debtors in bankruptcy and the instructor's view that it
is inevitable that debtors will use credit again, so they should learn to do so
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Use of consumer credit as a safety net is particularly
risky when the individual is already carrying a large and
troublesome balance of such credit, as many Americans do. 5
We do not understand why many consumers carry a high
amount of debt before they hit a crisis. In this article, I wish
to make an argument for more basic research to understand
demand for consumer credit. A related empirical question
that bears investigation is the long-term financial picture for
debtors after they file in bankruptcy. Are many of them back
in a lot of debt soon after bankruptcy?
A reason to focus on better understanding the demand for
consumer credit is that the supply side seems unlikely to
change. The supply side is easy to understand; the credit in-
dustry is driven by the profit motive. In the last twenty-five
years, the industry has been largely deregulated, and this has
led to explosive growth." There appears to be no political will
to reimpose interest rate limits to restrict supply. Industry
self-regulation seems equally unlikely, given that subprime
lending has become a well-established sector in consumer fi-
17
nance.
It is possible that we will look back on the current period
as one of social adjustment to the new world of deregulated
consumer credit. If progress toward reduction of over-
indebtedness is going to occur without reform of the supply
side, changes in consumer behavior or changes in the social
wisely) [hereinafter Braucher, Empiical Study of Debtor Education]; Jean
Braucher, Debtor Education and Interest Analysis, supra note 11, at 329 (dis-
cussing how instructors and materials in courses for bankruptcy debtors treat
future use of credit as inevitable, for example with materials that state,
'chances are you will probably need some type of loan in the future"); see also
Susan Block-Lieb et al., Lessons from the Trenches: Debtors Education in The-
ory Practice, 7 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 503, 509 (2002) (discussing the
goal of education of "enabling debtors to function more effectively in our credit-
based economy").
15. See Aizcorbe et al., supra note 2, at 29, tbl.14. In 2001, eleven percent
of families had debt payment-to-disposable income ratios of more than forty
percent, with rates for the same measure of twenty-seven and sixteen percent,
respectively, for the bottom and next to the bottom quintiles in income. Id The
same table shows that as of 2001, seven percent of families had a payment past
due sixty days or more, with the same measure at 13.4 and 11.7 percent, respec-
tively, for the bottom and next to bottom quintile in income. Id.
16. See supra note 1 for statistics on growth of outstanding consumer credit.
See also infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (concerning deregulation of
interest rates for consumer credit).
17. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 92-93 (noting movement of general
credit issuers into a subprime market).
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safety net, or possibly both, must occur. Taxes and transfer
payments would be a more open, direct and humane way of
providing safety net programs than allowing discharge of
debts in bankruptcy after use of consumer credit to survive a
financial crisis.'" Consumers pay for the bankruptcy safety
net in higher interest and in the stress and stigma of the ex-
perience both of bankruptcy and over-indebtedness, and the
credit industry also pays to some extent in lower profits. 9
Recognizing that new restrictions on supply of credit and
more complete social programs do not seem to be in the offing,
bankruptcy officials and scholars have begun to focus more on
the possibility of demand-side change. One manifestation of
this shift is the movement for debtor education in financial
management as part of the bankruptcy process. ° However
there are serious questions about whether educational initia-
tives should focus on a broader population (such as all school-
children or all persons applying for their first credit card) and
whether attempting to change consumer behavior concerning
credit is any more realistic than expecting creditors to hold
back on supply without legal restrictions.1
To evaluate whether debtors in bankruptcy or a broad
18. Jean Braucher, Response to Eric Posner, 7 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN.
L. 463, 466, n.21 (2002) (agreeing with Posner that taxes and transfer payments
are a better way to deal with redistribution than legal rules such as bankruptcy
law, but noting that when we fail to create an adequate safety net, the legal sys-
tem is forced to cope in other ways).
19. See inra note 59 and accompanying text (concerning credit industry ex-
aggeration of the cost to consumers of bankruptcy losses). Consumer bank-
ruptcy, like other consumer protection, imposes some costs on consumers, al-
though any given protection often imposes a very small cost. See Jean
Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal
Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 424-25 (1988) (concerning the FTC's
analysis of the cost of its Credit Practices Rule). Creditors also probably lose
some of their profits due to the costs of consumer bankruptcy; to the extent that
competition is not perfect, they can charge more than the sum of their costs plus
a competitive rate of return, and a corollary is that they may not be forced to
reduce rates when they save costs.
20. See generally Susan Block-Lieb et al., supra note 14; Karen Gross, Es-
tablishing Financial Literacy Programmes for Consumer Debtors: Complex Is-
sues on the Platter, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 3, at 204-11; see also Braucher, Empirical Study of Debtor Education, su-
pra note 14, at 560-61, 580-81 (discussing the history and growth of education
programs run by Chapter 13 trustees).
21. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma Be Taught?
Why Credit-Focused Debtor Education May Not Work, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945,
958 (1999) (noting that job skills and income may be more important to long-
term financial health than financial management ability).
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population should be targeted for personal financial education
and to understand the obstacles to financial stability in gen-
eral and after bankruptcy in particular, we need two kinds of
basic research. First, we need to understand why many con-
sumers increasingly carry high debt loads even before they
run into a financial crisis.22 Second, we need to follow bank-
ruptcy filers longitudinally.23 We do not know to what extent
bankruptcy is a turning point in consumer debtors' financial
lives, and how many continue to be over-indebted and for
what reasons. We do, however, have reason to believe that
reaffirmations in Chapter 7, the fresh start form of bank-
ruptcy,24 and unrealistic budgets in Chapter 13, the repay-
ment plan option," cause problems for debtors." Beyond
problems with how bankruptcy is being used, the obstacles to
long-term financial security after bankruptcy are a matter of
conjecture.
Our bankruptcy system provides temporary relief to
many debtors, and this alone might be considered to justify
its existence. If we aspire to improve the long-term financial
health of debtors after bankruptcy, however, we should be
trying to find out whether debtors really get a fresh start and
if not, what can be done to see that they do. The idea of a
"fresh start" is part of the mythology of consumer bank-
ruptcy2 7 but perhaps not the reality for most of those who file.
Of course, it may be overly optimistic to harbor the hope that
22. See infra text accompanying notes 71-92 (concerning the high baseline
of debt held by many families and its role in causing bankruptcy).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 108-32 (concerning the lack of knowl-
edge of bankruptcy filers' situations some years after bankruptcy).
24. Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (2004) is for-
mally called a "liquidation" bankruptcy, but because most consumer debtors
have no assets in excess of exemptions, no liquidation occurs; most Chapter 7
debtors get a discharge without liquidation. See Jean Braucher, Options in
Consumer Bankruptcy: An American Perspective, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 155,
160-64 (1999) (giving empirical rather than formal descriptions of Chapter 7
and Chapter 13, and emphasizing how the two chapters are in fact typically
used)-Chapter 7 usually involves no liquidation but often involves informal
repayment and reaffirmation of some debts, and Chapter 13 plans usually are
not completed-so that it is not clear that more repayment occurs in Chapter 13
than in Chapter 7).
25. See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1301-1330 (2004) (Chapter 13 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code).
26. See infra notes 109-25 and accompanying text (discussing reaffirmation
in Chapter 7 and failed plans in Chapter 13).
27. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 115-34 (1997) (concern-
ing the difference between a legal fresh start and a true fresh start).
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more knowledge of the demand side of the consumer credit
equation, before and after bankruptcy, would affect policy. It
remains to be seen whether Congress will be willing to back
away from industry-drafted legislation in the light of empiri-
cal research showing its premises are unfounded.28 The credit
industry likely will continue its drive for bankruptcy "reform"
that would increase costs for all filers, not just those with the
means to repay more of their debts.29 The proposed legisla-
tion would likely increase the supply of credit without affect-
ing consumer demand for it."° It may be hard in this political
climate to focus attention on better understanding demand.
II. WHAT WE Do KNow ABOUT DEBTORS IN BANKRUPTCY
In 2003, more than 1.6 million non-business bankruptcy
cases were filed in the United States.3 More than one million
personal cases have been filed every year since 1996.32 Fil-
ings have grown steadily in recent decades, from about
286,000 non-business cases in 1983 to the 1.6 million figure in
2003," reflecting a growth of 560 percent in twenty years.
In addition to the large growth in the numbers of filings,
28. See Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Empiricism: Lighthouse Still No
Good, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 425, 459 (2001) (reviewing TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL.,
THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000)) (discussing resistance
to change of opinion based on data).
29. See Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy The Problem
of Means, 7 FORDHAM. J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 407 (2002) (describing the likely
impact of the legislation-making it more difficult for all to access bankruptcy,
without doing a precise job of excluding the small percentage of abusers) [here-
inafter Braucher, Means Testing]. A huge "reform" package has been pending
in every Congress since the fall of 1997, but so far these bills have failed to win
final enactment for a variety of reasons. See Jacoby, supra note 3, at 294-99
(describing the origins and probable effects of the proposed legislation).
30. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 88 (noting economists suggest that
tougher bankruptcy laws would lead lenders to ease their standards further,
leading to more over-extension); Braucher, Means Testing, supra note 29, at
424-28 (explaining that creditors would react to reduced access to bankruptcy
by increasing the supply of credit, but that the marginal debtors who would be
offered credit as a result would not reject it); see also Diane Ellis, The Effect of
Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-Offs and
Personal Bankruptcy Rate, FDIC: BANK TRENDS (1998) (concerning an in-
creased propensity of high-risk debtors to borrow despite high cost), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analyticallbank/bt_9805.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2004).
31. See http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2004) (annual filing statistics provided by the American Bankruptcy Institute).
32. See id.
33. See id.
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what is known about bankruptcy debtors is primarily demo-
graphic. The people filing today are no better off than previ-
ous bankruptcy filers or than the rest of the population.' In
fact, their incomes are, at the median, significantly lower
than the national median income,35 and one-third have in-
comes at or below the poverty line.3' They are also carrying
more debt in relation to income compared to previous filers. 7
The total short-term (non-mortgage) debt to income ratio of
bankruptcy filers grew to exceed 1.5 as of 1997. as
Although debtors in bankruptcy are typically poor and
low-income, this does not mean that they are chronically so.
39There is considerable income volatility in the U.S. economy.
By indicia such as college attendance, job status, and home
homeownership, ninety percent of debtors in bankruptcy are
middle class." Most of the social safety net programs, such as
welfare, Medicaid, and public housing, are not designed for
middle-class persons. When middle-class persons experience
an income disruption, they often live on credit for a time, and
then go back to work, still owning some property such as a
34. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 83 n.124 (noting that bankruptcy
filers of the 1990s were in as much or more trouble as debtors of the early
1980s); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 66, tbl.2.4 (noting that the
median income in 1997 dollars of bankruptcy filers was $26,439 in 1981,
$21,155 in 1991, and $18,756 in 1997).
35. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 61 (bankruptcy filers in 1991 had a
median family income of $17,964, compared to $36,404 national median income
that year).
36. See id. at 63. Also, virtually no debtors had incomes above $75,000 in
income for 1991. Id. at 62.
37. See id. at 71, tbl.2.5 (showing that the median debt to income ratio in-
creased from 1.41 in 1981, to 1.68 in 1991, and to 2.44 in 1997).
38. See id, (showing a median total non-mortgage debt-income ratio of 1.54
in 1997, an increase from 0.75 in 1981 and 0.96 in 1991). This means that in
1997 a filer with median income and debt had $18,756 in income and over
$28,000 in short-term debt. See id. at 66, tbl.2.4 (providing median income of
filers for 1997). These ratios are based on total short-term debt, while the Fed-
eral Reserve has constructed an aggregate level measure of debt burden that
uses an estimate of total scheduled loan payments (interest plus minimum re-
payments of principal), divided by disposable income. See Aizcorbe et al., supra
note 2, at 27, 29 & tbl.14. The Federal Reserve measure thus incorporates long
repayment periods commonly used in credit card lending. By showing how
much of disposable income is committed to regular debt payments, the Federal
Reserve measure gives a feel for the hit to the family budget.
39. See Deborah D. Godwin, Dynamics of Households' Income, Debt, and
Attitudes Toward Credit, 1983-1989, 31 J. CONSUMER AFF. 303 (1997).
40. See Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes
Bankrupt, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 118-19 (2003).
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home or car, but unable to meet current expenses and at the
same time repay the debts they accumulated while unem-
ployed." These persons do not meet income or asset tests for
poverty programs.
The public and private insurance programs used by the
middle class, such as unemployment compensation and dis-
ability and health insurance, have large gaps,42 leading fami-
lies to use consumer credit in times of financial crisis.43 This
phenomenon contributes to the high volume of bankruptcy
cases. A self-financed safety net is possible for many because
of the ready availability of consumer credit to anyone who
continues to make minimum payments.' Consumers who run
balances on their credit cards are the "good" customers, in the
sense of producing profits, and are thus targeted for new
credit. 5
Because bankruptcy filers are mostly middle-class, exist-
ing literature on the underclass and chronically poor does not
capture their situation." We need new basic research if we
are to understand the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of
bankruptcy filers concerning personal finances, compared to
the rest of the middle class. There are reasons to suspect that
the filers and many non-filers are more similar than different,
as will be discussed.
41. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 57
(2003).
42. See Jacoby, supra note 3 (concerning gaps in public and private health
insurance); Deborah Maranville, Unemployment Insurance Meets Globalization
and the Modern Workforce, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1129 (concerning those in-
eligible for unemployment compensation).
43. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 79, Fig. 3.1 (reporting that two-
thirds of bankruptcy filers give job problem as a reason for bankruptcy); id. at
145, Fig. 5.1 (reporting 19.3 percent giving a medical reason for bankrupcy); id.
at 181 (reporting that more than fifteen percent identified marital disruption as
a reason).
44. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 91 (noting that borrowers who do
not pay in full each month are "good" customers because they earn credit card
issuers about seventy-five percent of their revenues).
45. See id. (noting that not only are those with balances the good customers,
but that companies have instituted charges or even cancelled the cards of those
who pay in full each month).
46. See, e.g., ALICE O'CONNOR, POVERTY KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE,
SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE POOR IN TWENTIETH CENTURY U.S. HISTORY (2001).
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III. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE REASONS FOR THE
INCREASED VOLUME OF CONSUMER DEBT
A. Supply and Demand
The increase in bankruptcy filings has occurred in tan-
dem with an increase in volume of consumer credit." Interest
rates for most consumer credit were deregulated in the early
to mid-1980s, after the U.S. Supreme Court held in Mar-
quette National Bank v. First Omaha" that the National
Bank Act permitted a national bank to take the interest rate
in the state where it was located and export it to customers in
other states, even if those states had lower usury limits. Na-
tional banks responded by locating subsidiaries in states with
high or no interest rate limits as a base to market credit cards
nationally." To protect their own state banks' competitive-
ness, most states responded by lifting usury limits." Also,
new credit industry sectors, such as rent-to-own and payday
lending, either used creative lawyering to do an end-run
around usury laws or got protective legislation enacted to
permit them to charge high rates."' Thus, understanding the
supply side of the increase in volume is not difficult. Con-
sumer credit is a highly profitable business.52
47. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1 (concerning increases in debt over the
last twenty-five years); supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (concerning
increases in bankruptcy filings since 1983); Robert M. Lawless, The Relation-
ship Between Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Filings and Various Basic Measures of
Consumer Debt (noting that as consumer debt increases, so do the number of
non-business bankruptcy filings), available at
http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rlawless/busbkr/filings.htm (last modified Jan.
10, 2004); see also Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., supra note 2 , 24-25 (noting that the
overall median debt of families rose 9.6 percent from 1998 to 2001, and that the
median credit card balance in 1998 and 2001 remained unchanged at $1,900,
but usage rose for families with incomes below the sixtieth percentile while it
fell for groups above that point, and that number of families having a credit
card rose 3.7 percent, to 76.2 percent of families in 2001).
48. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
49. See Ellis, supra note 30 (concerning the move of Maryland Bank, N.A. to
Delaware, where it became MBNA and could take advantage of Delaware law).
50. See generally James J. White, The Usury Trompe L'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV.
445 (2000) (concerning interest rate deregulation).
51. See generally Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered
Consumer Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge
to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 589 (2000).
52. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 92 (noting that credit cards are
Vol: 441074
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Understanding the demand side is not nearly as simple.
Americans have clearly been willing to take advantage of the
new credit that has been offered to them. In the last two dec-
ades we have seen a "democratization" of consumer credit,
with higher-risk debtors who previously lacked easy access
getting credit, albeit often at high rates. In retrospect, we
can see that usury restrictions on consumer credit-by con-
stricting supply-held back a tide, and some of that new vol-
ume is causing problems for consumers.
B. Usury
The history of usury restrictions is religious and cross-
cultural.54 Usury laws were based on the moral insight that
borrowing at interest to pay for current consumption carries a
high risk of increasing suffering. Charity was thought to be
the right response to need. Social welfare programs are a
modern analogue of charity. Many cultures first recognized
exceptions to usury limits for productive enterprise, such as
borrowing to buy seed, a kind of transaction where the loan
and interest could be repaid from the increase.55 After the
hardship caused in the ancient world by small personal loans
at high interest, the Christian world condemned usury, and it
was not until the early twentieth century that high rates of
interest for small loans for short-term consumption became
legal in the U.S.56 One cannot use consumer credit to borrow
one's way out of poverty,57 and a corollary seems to be that
even middle-class families often cannot borrow their way out
of a financial crisis.
All this being said, effective usury limits are dead and
about twice as profitable on average as all other banking activity).
53. Id. at 92-94 (noting the growing subprime and home equity markets,
and the targeting of young people, lower-income people, and those who recently
received a discharge in bankruptcy).
54. See James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of
Usury, 1981 ARiz. ST. L.J. 61, 63-93 (1981) (tracing the history of the law of
lending at interest from the ancient world to the twentieth century and describ-
ing evolution of philosophical thought as well as differences between law and
actual practices).
55. See id. at 65-67 (concerning lending at interest permitted in early com-
mercial societies).
56. See id. at 68, 92.
57. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 51 (analogizing efforts of fringe bor-
rowers to improve their financial situations while paying high prices for credit
to "trying to go up a descending escalator").
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gone and appear unlikely to come back. We probably will
continue to be awash in consumer credit. With this huge vol-
ume of consumer debt, the United States is likely to continue
to see high numbers of bankruptcies.
C. Potential Reforms
As the numbers of bankruptcies grew even during the
boom years of the 1990s, the credit industry began to lobby
for a credit-industry "reform" package." Rather than focusing
on the tandem growth of consumer credit volume and bank-
ruptcy, the industry argued for new restrictions on access to
bankruptcy, using an unsupportable claim that each Ameri-
can family was paying $400 a year for the bankruptcies of
others, when the true figure is a tiny fraction of that.9 The
industry legislation, which has been introduced in every Con-
gress since 1997, is billed as "means testing" to make those
with the means to repay do so in Chapter 13 rather than al-
lowing them to get a quick discharge in Chapter 76 But as
noted, debtors who file in bankruptcy are increasingly worse
off, so the increases in filings are not a result of better off per-
sons resorting to the bankruptcy courts.6 In reality, the pro-
posed legislation would reduce access to bankruptcy, primar-
ily by increasing the costs through new, largely pointless
paperwork burdens 2 and institutional hurdles such as re-
quired credit counseling before filing for bankruptcy and re-
quired debtor education after filing, as a condition of dis-
charge.63 The higher cost of bankruptcy, in terms of both
money and time, would likely make it unaffordable for debt-
58. See Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy
Reform, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189, 196-200 (1999) (describing creditor lobby-
ing in the late 1990s for reduced access to bankruptcy); Edith H. Jones & Todd
J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177 (1999) (arguing
that in a period of prosperity, the growing bankruptcy rate should be curbed).
59. See Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of So-
cial Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 13-20 (2002) (describing
the use of the $400 per family figure despite its gross inaccuracy and analyzing
why the correct figure is perhaps ten to forty dollars, or less).
60. See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 58.
61. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
62. See Braucher, Means Testing, supra note 29, at 430-41 (discussing exist-
ing controls on abuse and the complexity of the means-testing paperwork under
the proposed legislation).
63. See id. at 442-43.
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ors who are the worst off.'
If we were serious about catching the small percentage of
abusers in the system-those who have the income to repay a
significant portion of their debts-we would simplify our
bankruptcy law and have just one option: requiring anyone
with income above some threshold to repay a portion of that
income for three-to-five years.65 The current system is much
too complex to be transparent. Neither consumers nor politi-
cians understand it.
It is unclear whether the industry legislative package
will be enacted. By reducing access to bankruptcy, the legis-
lation predictably would increase the volume of consumer
credit even more, as creditors responded to lower bankruptcy
losses by further opening the spigots of supply.66 We would
likely see more people struggling with debt and more
bankruptcies in absolute terms, although spread across a
larger volume of credit.
Already, the number of people struggling with debt is
much greater than the number filing in bankruptcy.67 There
is a much larger pool of consumer debtors who are at risk of
filing than those who file.' Also, there is reason to believe
64. See id. at 424-30.
65. See Jean Braucher & Charles W. Mooney Jr., Means Measurement
Rather than Means Testing Using the Tax System to Collect from Can-Pay
Consumer Debtors After Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 22, 2003, at 6.
(presenting a proposal to require all Chapter 7 debtors above a threshold in-
come level to pay, according to a graduated scale, a percentage of income for
three years after discharge, with collections distributed to creditors). This ap-
proach would catch abusers at the back end, based on actual income, rather
than basing means testing on a look-back period, which might not be an accu-
rate projection of future income. See id. The proposal does not entail elimina-
tion of Chapter 13, but that feature could be added, on the grounds that if all
debtors with means are being required to repay, there is no need for the com-
plexity of Chapter 13. See id. The elimination of Chapter 13 is also justified on
the grounds that most Chapter 13 plans fail. See infra notes 119-28 and accom-
panying text (concerning high failure rate in Chapter 13).
66. See Braucher, Means Testing, supra note 29, at 424-28.
67. For example, more people seek credit counseling than file for bank-
ruptcy, indicating a broader problem of trouble handling debts. See Richard L.
Stehl, The Failings of the Credit Counseling and Debtor Education Require-
ments of the Proposed Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Legislation of 1998, 7 AM
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 148-49 (1999) (noting that the capacity of credit coun-
seling agencies was inadequate to handle two million requests for credit coun-
seling in 1997, even without required counseling).
68. See Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to Fle for Bankruptcy: A Critical
Look at the Incentives Under US. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for
Change, 65 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1998) (finding that approximately fifteen
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that this risk pool suffers from anxiety-related psychological
and social problems, including family problems, health prob-
lems, and work problems." Unmanageable debt and result-
ing stress are not good for people. Bankruptcy "reform" ini-
tiatives tend to deflect attention from the bigger problem of
over-indebtedness by focusing on those who file as if they
were deviant "others." Thinking of filers as deviant avoids
facing up to the even more alarming possibility that they
could be a lot like many other Americans, until they get a
pink slip, become ill, or experience family breakup. We know
that demographically the filers are middle class.7" What we
do not know is whether their knowledge, attitudes, and be-
havior are different from the rest of the middle class or, to a
large extent, similar.
IV. UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY AND DEMAND FOR CREDIT
A. Causes of Bankruptcy
To understand the high volume of consumer bankrupt-
cies, it is helpful to see bankruptcy filers in the context of the
larger population of those who are over-indebted and at risk
of filing.7' Filing in bankruptcy usually involves four eco-
nomic factors:
(1) lack of family reserves, either in the form of savings"
or of an at-home adult who could go to work or become a
caregiver for a sick family member;
7 3
(2) a high debt load in relation to income;7 4
(3) a trigger that radically decreases income or increases
percent of U.S. households as of 1992 would have benefited financially from fil-
ing in bankruptcy and that even more would have benefited with advance plan-
ning).
69. See NICK HULS, OVERINDEBTEDNESS OF CONSUMERS IN THE EC
MEMBER STATES: FACTS AND SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 204-10 (1994) (discussing
negative social and psychological impact of struggles with debt among Europe-
ans).
70. See supra notes 39-40, 67-70, and accompanying text.
71. See White, supra note 68 (discussing the larger population that could
benefit from bankruptcy).
72. See supra note 2 (concerning lack of saving by a large part of the popu-
lation).
73. See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 41, at 55-70 (discussing how the stay-
at-home mother, particularly a generation or two ago, served as a safety net).
74. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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expenses (such as job loss, divorce, or illness; illness may
cause job loss and thus loss of income or uninsured health
care expenses or both);75 and
(4) a lack of a safety net to cover the triggering crisis suffi-
ciently, so that, for example, unemployment insurance is
too small or not available at all, or health care costs are
not insured publicly or privately. 6
The first two factors, lack of savings and high debt, are
present for a significant part of the population, and the fourth
factor is also increasingly present for many persons, making
filers similar to many others on these three factors.77 In this
sense, the trigger "causes" the bankruptcy, but in reality all
four factors contribute to it. Social legislation and private in-
surance could reduce the fourth factor, but prospects for that
sort of change are doubtful. Also doubtful are prospects for
change in the rates of job loss, divorce, or illness. Jobs in par-
ticular are becoming less secure, with unemployment benefits
not filling the gap.78
This perspective highlights that the first two factors, lack
of savings and high debt, are important causes of bankruptcy.
It is worth evaluating whether change is possible in these ar-
eas to reduce over-indebtedness as well as bankruptcy, and
the attendant stress and suffering. Why do so many Ameri-
cans lack savings, even in the middle class? Why do they run
up significant debts prior to the triggering crisis, so that the
crisis proves unmanageable and pushes them over the edge
into bankruptcy? These are the areas where, at least in the-
ory, families could make changes and reduce problems with
debt. We need to understand better the lack of savings and
high indebtedness, not just for those who file but for the
whole risk pool of Americans who would be unable to handle a
triggering crisis given their lack of reserves and mound of
debt.
The debt picture is complex. Not everyone who becomes
over-indebted stays that way or files for bankruptcy. There
75. See supra notes 3, 43.
76. See supra notes 3, 42.
77. See supra note 2 (concerning lacking of any savings by 40 percent of
Americans); supra notes 1 & 15 (concerning growing consumer indebtedness);
supra note 42 (concerning gaps in health insurance and unemployment insur-
ance).
78. See supra note 42.
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appears to be even more debt mobility than income mobility;79
those with the highest debt loads are often able to pay them
down, only to be replaced by new persons carrying high debt
loads."0 The idea of "the over-indebted American household"
does not capture these dynamics and tends to evoke an overly
simplistic picture.8 Many families pass through periods of
over-indebtedness. If a financial crisis occurs at such a time,
the family could easily end up in bankruptcy.
B. Existing Research on Attitudes Toward Debt
There is very little research on Americans' attitudes to-
ward debt. 2 There is some reason to believe that Americans
are developing more negative attitudes about borrowing even
as we use credit more. 3 This is not surprising; media atten-
tion as well as exposure to the debt problems of friends and
relatives or one's self could explain this direction of change in
attitude. On the other hand, there may be growing accep-
tance of borrowing to pay normal living expenditures.' In
short, the complexity in our attitudes toward debt bears in-
vestigation. Perhaps the simple fact of ready supply has
made debt seem normal and inevitable.8 '
There has been more research in England. 6 Using the
social science method of network analysis, 7 one study asked
ordinary people the question, "Why do people use credit and
get into debt?"8 Their answers provided this network of ex-
planations: greed, pleasure, lack of self control, personal in-
adequacy, external problems, crises, social pressures, com-
79. See Godwin, supra note 39, at 322.
80. See id.
81. Seeid. at 323.
82. See id. at 306.
83. See id. at 306-07.
84. See id. at 307.
85. See Stephen E.G. Lea et al., Psychological Factors in Consumer Debt:
Money Management, Economic Socialization, and Credit Use, 16 J. EcON.
PSYCHOL. 681, 682 (1995) (finding, in a study of a British population taken from
the Oxford University subject panel, that those with problems repaying debt
described themselves as being in a community where debt was more common
and more tolerated, as compared to those without problems with debt).
86. See, e.g., id.
87. This method makes use of the explanations of ordinary people about the
causes of complex social problems to gain insight into shared beliefs. See Peter
K. Lunt & Sonia M. Livingston, Everyday Explanations for Personal Debt: A
Network Approach, 30 BRITISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 309, 309-11 (1991).
88. See id. at 313.
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mercial pressures, and the credit system." It is interesting
that ordinary English people do not speak of using credit to
meet their human needs. Of course, English consumers may
have different attitudes from Americans.90
The explanations given in this study are consistent with
more general insights of behavioral economics, which include
the perspective that we do not act on our pre-existing rational
preferences but rather are influenced by aspects of our social
situations, specifically how situations are framed,9' including
some situational influences we do not even necessarily per-
ceive.92 Standard money management programs reflect intui-
tive understanding of behavioral economics by attempting to
educate consumers to be more aware of factors influencing
consumer decisions, such as marketing techniques, our own
moods, and our families and friends.
V. DEBTOR EDUCATION AS A SOLUTION TO THE INCREASED
USE OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
Debtor education in bankruptcy is a programmatic re-
sponse to the higher numbers of bankruptcy filings in recent
years, and one that involves focusing on the demand side of
the consumer credit system. Some bankruptcy officials and
some scholars are pushing education in financial manage-
ment as a key way to address the growth in bankruptcy fil-
ings.94
89. See id. at 318-20.
90. This could be in part, for example, because consumer culture follows
along there at a time lag. See Adler, supra note 8.
91. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003).
92. See id. at 154, 157-59.
93. See, e.g., PERSONAL FINANCIAL CHOICES: SETING A NEW COURSE (a co-
operative effort of the National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees, the National
Foundation for Consumer Credit and its Member Counseling Service Agencies,
and Visa, USA) (copy on file with the author). This source is a workbook used
in Chapter 13 debtor education programs, including chapters on "Communicat-
ing Your Philosophy of Money," dealing with identifying the values that under-
lie spending decisions and understanding feelings about money and the role of
relationships with family members and friends in spending decisions, and on
"Advertising and Sales Techniques-Problems and Solutions," dealing with how
advertisers play upon our feelings and insecurities and discussing strategies for
resisting impulse buying. See id.
94. See Braucher, Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 14 (con-
cerning programs begun by Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 trustees); Block-Lieb et
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The credit industry has joined the debtor education
movement by supporting efforts of trustees" and scholars
96
and also by putting mandatory credit counseling and manda-
tory debtor education into its bill.97 The type of education
that would satisfy the proposed requirement would be
unlikely to have much long-term effect. A course of a few
hours (covering the typical money management topics, includ-
ing budgeting, setting goals, saving, shopping wisely and re-
sisting overspending),99 even if well designed and executed,
may not be capable of changing behavior for long, if at all.99 If
education becomes a legal requirement to get a discharge,
programs would spring into being and predictably many
would be poor in quality °° or, worse, predatory and fraudu-
lent, trying to sell something to a vulnerable population. The
creditor push for mandatory debtor education in bankruptcy
began without a prior exploration of whether filers are differ-
ent from non-filers in their knowledge, attitudes, and behav-
ior and of what sorts of education would be most effective. 0'
al., supra note 14; Gross, supra note 20 (concerning a pilot program designed to
study the impact of debtor education in bankruptcy and advocating for this type
of education).
95. See Braucher, Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 14, at
580 (concerning support of Visa, USA, for programs run by trustees).
96. See Block-Lieb et al., supra note 14, at 511, 523 n.1 (noting participation
of bankers on the board of directors for the Coalition for Consumer Bankruptcy
Debtor Education, which designed a pilot program providing debtor education in
bankruptcy).
97. See Braucher, Means Testing, supra note 29, at 442-43 (concerning
mandatory counseling and education features of the proposed legislation).
98. See Braucher, Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 14, at
581-84 (describing how mandatory educational programs run by Chapter 13
trustees in some areas range from two to four hours on one day, in some cases
the same day that the debtor reports for examination by the trustee concerning
assets and expenses, and describing topics covered in existing programs).
99. Short debtor education programs do seem to make debtors feel better,
and the attendees still have positive opinions of the courses up to a year and a
half later. See Braucher, Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 14,
at 567. There has been no study of longer-term impacts or of impacts measured
by actual behavior, as opposed to self-reported attitudes and self-reported be-
havior, except for a study that could not find evidence of impact on Chapter 13
plan completion. See id. at 577-79 (finding that other Chapter 13 trustee prac-
tices appeared to have more influence on plan completion than education pro-
grams, and that education programs did not show positive association with
completion after regression analysis to take into account other influences).
100. See Block-Lieb et al., supra note 14, at 521-22 (noting a lack of clear
guidance on the ends of education in the proposed legislation, as well as lack of
funding).
101. See id. at 521 (criticizing the lack of guidance on evaluation of programs
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It is understandable that the credit industry would support
mandatory education even if ineffective in changing debtors'
future prospects. The education requirement would create a
hurdle to accessing the bankruptcy discharge while also serv-
ing the rhetorical function of assigning debtors responsibility
for their own problems." 2 If the required education also failed
to reduce use of credit, so much the better from the perspec-
tive of creditor interests. 10 3 For those without this sort of self-
interest, however, long-term effectiveness should matter, if
the goal is more than temporary good feelings.
For at least three reasons, research is needed comparing
bankruptcy filers to the rest of the population with respect to
their financial knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. First, if
bankruptcy debtors are much like the rest of the middle class,
this might suggest that financial management education
should be made more generally available or be required for
all, and that the education should be given over a long period
of time, to maximize chances for success. Financial education
could begin in preschool, with simple, concrete examples, and
be incorporated into arithmetic and social studies in elemen-
tary school and then made part of practical life curricula and
economics courses in secondary school. Freshmen in college
might learn about the costs and risks of using credit as they
are first offered credit cards. Passing a test on use of credit
could even be required before issuance of a credit card, much
as drivers are required to pass a test on rules of the road be-
fore getting a license. Requiring financial education for all
young people makes it part of socialization, rather than a pro-
gram that labels some adults as deviants, a risk with
mandatory debtor education in bankruptcy.0 4  Requiring
debtors in bankruptcy to take an educational program seems
to assume that they are different, rather than unlucky, but
in the legislation and noting that a pilot test under the proposed legislation
would start only after the effective date of the legislation, including its educa-
tion requirement).
102. See Braucher, Debtor Education and Interest Analysis, supra note 11, at
339.
103. See id.
104. See Carol Ann Curnock, Evolution of Statutory Consumer Counselling
in Canada and Europe: Insolvency Counselling-Innovation Based on the Four-
teenth Century, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 387 (1999) (criticizing required Cana-
dian counseling in bankruptcy for assuming debtors are irresponsible and devi-
ant in multiple ways).
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we do not know whether or to what extent this is so. If we
find that they are not different, this could suggest that either
socialization programs for the whole population or safety net
programs for all would be better strategies than programs
treating bankruptcy debtors as deviants.
Second, even if bankruptcy debtors do turn out to be dif-
ferent in their knowledge, attitudes, or behavior, we need to
know how they are different (and, as will be discussed, what
obstacles they face) in order to be able to design effective edu-
cational programs. It is common in financial management
education to go beyond providing information and to teach
how framing devices of marketing or influences of family
members can lead a person into financial trouble." 5 Prelimi-
nary work in studying voluntary debtor education in bank-
ruptcy suggests that information is less what is needed than
learning to be sensitive to one's attitudes, moods, and family
influences.' 6 We do not know if bankruptcy filers are more
easily influenced by the consumer credit industry than others
are.
Finally, there are difficult normative and feasibility is-
sues involved in designing financial management education
in general, issues that are heightened with mandatory debtor
education in bankruptcy. Should these programs teach old-
fashioned middle-class virtues of prudence, diligence in ac-
cumulation of wealth, personal responsibility, and delayed
gratification? 7 What if the middle class no longer holds
these values?' Is it realistic to attempt to change culture
105. See supra note 93.
106. See Richard L. Wiener et al., High and Low SES Debtors: The Use of
Psychological Measures to Determine Differences, JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING
STUDIES 27 (2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/babc/ (last visited
Jan. 11, 2004) (discussing hypothesis that emotion and motivation are more
important than information in influencing behavior concerning shopping and
incurring debt).
107. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., G. Allen & Unwin, ltd. 1930).
108. Certainly there have been huge changes in American culture in recent
decades. See generally e.g., HERBERT J. GANS, MIDDLE AMERICAN
INDIVIDUALISM (1988) (describing middle Americans as increasingly fighting an
uphill battle for economic security and describing how they have separated
themselves from civic and political participation). The middle Americans Gans
writes about are not necessarily middle class in traditional senses, such as
based on either education, occupation and income, or on values. Rather, he fo-
cuses on the middle of the white population of the United States. See id. at 8.
People in this group generally distrust big, powerful organizations, whether
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through education? It is one thing to educate young people
into norms held in the culture, and another to try to educate
them to resist and change culture.
When the students of financial management education
are adults in a financial crisis, it is particularly important to
think through whether the normative assumptions of a re-
quired program are in keeping with those of the population
generally. Is it appropriate to set expectations for bankruptcy
filers at a level that involves trying to teach them to be better
personal financial managers than most people are? Further-
more, unless education in bankruptcy produces attitudinal
and behavioral change that contributes measurably to more
stable financial futures, the primary function of required pro-
grams in bankruptcy is to create a hurdle to accessing the
benefits of bankruptcy. Debtor education also serves a secon-
dary rhetorical function of putting the focus on debtors as re-
sponsible for avoidance of financial problems, rather than see-
ing responsibility as shared by debtors, creditors, and our
society in general, in the way it defines public and private
health and unemployment insurance programs. The causes
of bankruptcy are in part structural, involving the many inse-
curities of the middle class in the contemporary economy, as
well as cultural and personal. Debtor education addresses
only the latter two types of cause. Meanwhile, structural fac-
tors likely produce and reinforce cultural and personal atti-
tudes, making it hard to change the latter. For example,
heavy marketing of easy credit is likely to reinforce the atti-
tude that using easy credit is unproblematic, and educational
programs will have an uphill battle against the market-tested
campaigns of the advertising world.
VI. THE LONGITUDINAL PICTURE AFTER BANKRUPTCY
We do not know in any systematic way the financial
situations of debtors one, three, five, or ten years after a
bankruptcy filing, whether in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. We
do not know who gets out of trouble and builds a sound finan-
cial future and why.
One area where there is some limited knowledge con-
business or government, and may be more willing to act dishonestly toward a
big business that is itself seen as immoral, unless dealing with a seemingly
moral individual working within it. See id. at 30, 39.
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cerns repayment by debtors even after discharge, in some
cases impairing their fresh starts. Debtors who file and get a
discharge in Chapter 7 are not eligible to file for another dis-
charge in Chapter 7 for six years."9 Many Chapter 7 debtors
reaffirm some of their debts that would otherwise be dis-
charged, and others continue to pay some debts informally."'
Reaffirmation of a home mortgage can be a good choice for a
debtor, since alternative housing may be more expensive and
the lender may insist on the reaffirmation."' A debtor who
can simply continue making mortgage payments without re-
affirming is better off, however, because the debtor will get a
discharge from personal liability and will have the option of
walking away from the deal and simply giving up the home,
should it prove unaffordable or become worth less than the
amount of the mortgage.
11 2
The wisdom of reaffirmation of car loans is even more de-
batable, because sometimes there are less risky alternatives
(simply continuing to pay, without becoming personally li-
able, with the creditor acquiescing or by court-protected ride
through of the loan) or cheaper (negotiating to pay less than
the full loan on a threat to convert to Chapter 13 and "cram
down" the loan, paying only the value of the collateral)."3
109. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2004).
110. See Marianne Culhane & Michaela White, Debt After Discharge: An
Empirical Study ofReaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 720, 730, 741, 745-46
(1999) [hereinafter Culhame & White, Debt After Discharge]. This article notes
that one quarter of debtors in the study reaffirmed one or more debts, with forty
percent of those debtors reaffirming unsecured debt, and it also discusses many
instances where debtors retained collateral without reaffirmation, by continuing
to repay, with creditor acquiescence or judicial protection for the debtor, letting
the secured debt ride through bankruptcy).
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) (2004) (referring to reaffirmation of secured
debts). When a debtor is current on payments, the debtor may be able to simply
repay through creditor acquiescence, or in four circuits, the courts protect the
debtor against foreclosure, permitting the secured debt on which the debtor is
current to simply ride through the bankruptcy. See Marianne Culhane &
Michaela White, But Can She Keep the Car? Some Thoughts on Collateral Re-
tention in Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, 7 FoRDHAM. J. CORP. & FIN. L., 471, 477-
78, 487-88 (2002) (concerning ride through of secured loans, something the in-
dustry reform legislation would eliminate, making reaffirmation and creditor
acquiescence the only ways to retain a home, with the additional option of re-
demption for a car under 11 U.S.C. § 722 (2004)).
112. See supra notes 110-11 (concerning creditor acquiescence and court-
protected ride-through for secured loans).
113. Because there is no cramdown in Chapter 13 for mortgages secured only
by a principal residence, it is harder to negotiate to pay less than the full loan
amount in Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2004). But with personal
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Debtors' lawyers sometimes go along with reaffirmations on
secured loans to avoid the work of negotiating for a better
deal for the debtor client."'
Reaffirming unsecured debts is almost always a bad idea,
yet many debtors do and get a "stale start, ' . 5 in that they
emerge from bankruptcy personally obligated for debts that
they could have discharged. The reasons for reaffirmation in-
clude lazy lawyers in some cases or, in others, unrepresented
clients, who do not understand that reaffirmation is not re-
quired.116
One implication of the data on reaffirmation is that the
timing of proposed mandatory debtor education in bankruptcy
may be wrong. If education came before filing, debtors could
be forewarned that reaffirming unsecured debts impairs the
fresh start as well as prospects for long-term financial secu-
rity.
Chapter 13 debtors typically commit to a repayment plan
of three to five years, and therefore do not get an immediate
fresh start."7 The process of completing a plan is often ardu-
property collateral, lawyers can sometimes negotiate for their clients to pay less
than the loan amount in Chapter 7, on the threat to convert to Chapter 13 and
cramdown the loan to collateral value under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2), 1325(a)(5).
114. See Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own
Informed Choices-A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 165, 179-80 (1997) [hereinafter Braucher, Counseling Consumer
Debtors] (describing the use of this strategy by some lawyers and generally dis-
cussing the need for more negotiation if lawyers are to best serve their debtor
clients' interests).
115. See William C. Whitford, Changing Definitions of Fresh Start in U.S.
Bankruptcy Law, 20 J. CONSUMER POLY 179 (1997); see also Culhane & White,
Debt After Discharge, supra note 110, at 730 (finding that reaffirmations oc-
curred in twenty-five percent of cases, and that forty percent of them involved
reaffirmation of unsecured debts).
116. See Culhane & White, Debt After Discharge, supra note 110, at 736
(concerning creditor use of threats to challenge dischargeability and force an
adversary proceeding as a possible means to get reaffirmation); see also NA-
TIONAL CONSUMER LAw CENTER, LEARNING FINANCIAL LITERACY IN
BANKRUPTCY: CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY EDUCATION PROJECT SURVEY REPORT,
at 5-6 (reporting that in a survey of Chapter 7 debtors, six percent thought reaf-
firmations may be required and 22.6% did not know whether they were volun-
tary or required), available at
http://www.nclc.org/initiavies/bankruptcy/content/bankruptcy-survey-content.h
tm (last visited Mar. 8, 2004).
117. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(d), 1325(b)(1)(A), (B) (allowing plans to last up to
five years and, if debts are not paid in full, requiring debtors to commit dispos-
able income for three years to avoid confirmation challenge); id. § 1328(a) (typi-
cally calling for discharge after completion of the plan).
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ous, as debtors try to pay for homes and cars and also repay
part of their old unsecured debt, while meeting current ex-
penses."8  Most Chapter 13 debtors do not complete their
plans and thus do not get a discharge unless they file again,
either in Chapter 7 or once more in Chapter 13."' There is a
great deal of interest in serial filing of Chapter 13 as an abu-
sive practice (for example, filing and staying in Chapter 13
just long enough to halt a foreclosure). 2 ° But the more com-
mon serial filing phenomenon probably involves a debtor who
cannot manage under an arduous plan and fails, only to try•121 b
again. This behavior is not abusive; the more pertinent
question is whether the debtor should have either had a more
realistic Chapter 13 plan to begin with or filed in Chapter 7
because a repayment plan was not feasible. Many debtors
propose too burdensome Chapter 13 plans that obviously will
fail.'22 When plans are unrealistic from the outset, often the
fault is with the debtors' lawyers,'23 document preparers,' or,
118. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 277 (discussing external encour-
agement or moral compulsion as reasons for ill-fated attempts to repay debts in
Chapter 13).
119. See William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice. Consumer
Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection and Consumer Protection in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 411 (1994) (stating that thirty-one percent
of cases were closed as completed); see also Braucher, Empirical Study of Debtor
Education, supra note 14, at n.5 (citing various empirical studies of completion);
§ 1328(a) (providing for discharge generally after plan completion). A debtor
can convert to Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a), and file in Chapter 7 after dis-
missal or file again in Chapter 13. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 273-76
(discussing the high Chapter 13 failure rate and proposing that conversion to
Chapter 7 be the default rule, rather than dismissal).
120. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 276-81 (generally describing repeat
filing in Chapter 13); id. at 278 (discussing filing to delay foreclosure).
121. See Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once Is Not Enough: Preserving Consumers'
Rights to Bankruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L.J. 455, 475-76 (1999) (reporting the
results of a survey finding that Chapter 13 trustees generally did not favor
blocking the right to refile and did not identify repeat filings as a major source
of abuse).
122. See Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors, supra note 114, at 181-82
(discussing failure to budget realistically); id. at 185-86 (arguing that debtors'
lawyers should be warning their clients of the high risk of failure in Chapter 13
and explaining the consequences of failure).
123. See id.
124. In some districts, debtors use document preparers at very high rates.
See VISA CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 1997 BANKRUPTCY PETITION STUDY (1997)
(reporting that 22.5 percent of California Chapter 13 debtors in the study filed
pro se), available at
http://www.abiworld.org/Content/NavigationMenu/NewsRoom/ResearchCente
r/BankruptcyReportsResearch andTestimonyl/General 1/BankruptcyPetitio
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in the case of unrepresented debtors, Chapter 13 trustees and
the courts, which often do not raise the feasibility issue. 2'
Given the high failure rate in Chapter 13, the biggest means
testing problem in consumer bankruptcy seems to be a failure
to test for means to complete a Chapter 13 plan.
126
As with the problems resulting from Chapter 7 reaffirma-
tions, the problem of unrealistic Chapter 13 plans suggests
that the timing of proposed mandatory education may be
wrong. If education came before debtors filed their Chapter
13 plans (typically the plan is filed with the petition), they
could learn the importance of a realistic budget to plan suc-
127
cess.
Among the debtors who avoid reaffirming debts in Chap-
ter 7, various other reasons may mean they will not benefit
fully from their discharges. Most consumer debtors have no
non-exempt property at risk and should not file in bankruptcy
until they are back to work and have income to protect. 12 If
they file when they still have to incur more debt to get by,
whether to live on or for medical expenses, they will quickly
be back in debt trouble. Also, if the underlying cause of bank-
ruptcy was too little income to cover current expenses, bank-
ruptcy alone will not get the debtor out of financial trouble.
Before filing, such a debtor needs to either increase income or
decrease expenses; otherwise debts will just begin to mount
again. In short, good use of Chapter 7 requires advance
n_Study.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
125. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2004) (setting a feasibility test for confirma-
tion of a Chapter 13 plan).
126. See supra note 119 (concerning the high failure rate of Chapter 13
plans); Braucher, Means Testing, supra note 29, at 417-18 (discussing the lack
of concern in the reform legislation about "can't pay" debtors who do not have
the means to succeed in Chapter 13 but who try and fail).
127. See Braucher, Debtor Education and Interest Analysis, supra note 11, at
328 (noting that providing education after filing means that it comes too late to
allow instruction about the importance of realistic budgeting to be put into prac-
tice in drawing up the Chapter 13 plan or in making a choice of chapter in light
of whether Chapter 13 is feasible).
128. Most Chapter 7 cases are no asset. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at
137 (stating that about ninety-five percent of Chapter 7 cases are no asset, and
most of the five percent with assets are business rather than personal cases).
The benefit of a discharge in a no asset case is that post-petition income is pro-
tected from pre-petition creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2004) (providing that
earnings of an individual after commencement of a case are not property of the
estate). A debtor with no nonexempt equity in a home and no income may none-
theless feel a need to file to stop a foreclosure, but unless there is income to pay
the mortgage, the bankruptcy filing will not protect the home for long.
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analysis in light of the lessons of good financial management.
Furthermore, if the debtor's fundamental problem could eas-
ily occur again (another layoff, another bout with an unin-
sured medical problem), new debt troubles may recur despite
the best planning.
Those who complete a Chapter 13 plan, only a third of
Chapter 13 filers, 2 9 may be the most likely to succeed finan-
cially in the long run. Such debtors learn to live on a budget
for a number of years, and when the plan is completed, these
debtors may suddenly have extra disposable income each
month (the amount of their plan payments that represents
repayment of old unsecured debt). On the other hand, if they
had filed in Chapter 7 instead and realized the importance of
saving, they might have gotten on the road to a sound finan-
cial future more quickly; they might have saved the amount
of their unsecured debt repayments, building a nest egg
rather than completing a Chapter 13 plan.
130
We know little about the financial situations of debtors
after bankruptcy. Who does well and who does not? What
are the key factors in the success stories? Are increased in-
come and good health insurance most crucial to staying out of
debt and beginning to save? Or is it learning to budget? Or
could it be that having payroll deductions of savings is what
makes the most difference? If more income is the key, job
training would be a more effective strategy than financial
management education."' If payroll deduction of savings is a
big factor, more promotion of this strategy would be advis-
able. We also do not know who gets into trouble again after a
129. See supra 119 and accompanying text (discussing non-completion rate).
130. Many debtors who file in Chapter 13 are not counseled about this alter-
native, which is more likely to meet debtors' goals in circuits that permit ride-
through of secured debts in Chapter 7. See supra notes 110-11. Many Chapter
13 plans primarily involve repayment of secured debt, so that the small amount
repaid to general unsecured creditors is not enough to make the debtor flunk
the "substantial abuse" test in Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b); see also Scott
F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Dis-
charge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 434,
n.61 (1999) (19.1 percent of Chapter 13 plan payments nationally in 1998 went
to general unsecured creditors); Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors, supra
note 114, at 189 (noting that saving in Chapter 7 the amount that would have
been paid to unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 would probably make the debtor
better off financially compared to the benefits of lower cost credit that might be
available to a debtor who completed a Chapter 13 plan).
131. See Dickerson, supra note 21, at 958.
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bankruptcy and why (other than that many debtors reaffirm
debts in Chapter 7, impairing their fresh starts, or fail to
complete plans in Chapter 13).1" The gaping holes in our
knowledge make it hard to evaluate how successful bank-
ruptcy is in providing a fresh start. Lack of knowledge also
makes it hard to design good education programs. It is of
course possible to teach about all the usual pitfalls to a stable
financial situation, '33 but education for debtors in bankruptcy
could be better designed for the real problems that filers en-
counter after their discharge, if only we knew what those
problems are.
VII. CONCLUSION
Borrowing to get by in a financial crisis-and thus using
consumer credit as a safety net-is part of the context of our
soaring personal bankruptcy numbers. But another impor-
tant factor is the baseline of debt that many families carry be-
fore a crisis. Creditors have made a burgeoning supply of
consumer credit available in response to deregulation of in-
terest rates, a development that has made very high risk
lending profitable.
This article argues that we need more basic research to
understand why many families are carrying big burdens of
debt in general. We also need basic research to develop a lon-
gitudinal picture of debtors after bankruptcy, to learn
whether most debtors really get a fresh start and build more
secure financial futures, as well as why some fail while others
succeed.
Both types of research advocated here involve the de-
mand side of the consumer credit equation. With better un-
derstanding of demand in general, we might be able to speed
social adjustment to the world of easy credit. Also, with more
132. See supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
133. These pitfalls include not saving and failing to keep debt burdens low.
See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 41, at 163-67 (discussing the idea of a family
conducting "a financial fire drill," to see whether it has enough savings to live
for six months without the income of one of two earners in the family, whether
its fixed expenses are as low as possible, and making sure it has insurance to
cover serious health problems or disability). For a family that has just filed in
bankruptcy, perhaps because of unemployment or illness, the idea of having
enough savings anytime soon to be able to live on them for six months may be
very discouraging, and getting health or disability insurance once one already
has an illness or disability may be problematic or impossible.
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knowledge of the new debt problems debtors get into after
bankruptcy, we might be able to figure out how to get them
off the treadmill.
Although it is worth striving for new approaches to re-
duce problems with over-indebtedness and bankruptcy, the
underlying causes of financial insecurity are complex. They
include income disruptions, illness, family break-up, lack of
savings, high debt to begin with, and limited private and pub-
lic insurance programs for unemployment, disability, and
health care. Easy credit and structural financial inseclirity
likely contribute to cultural and individual acceptance of re-
sort to bankruptcy. With so many factors in play, structural,
cultural and personal, we should not expect the need for
bankruptcy relief as part of the safety net to disappear any
time soon, particularly if interest rates for consumer credit
remain unregulated.
